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CASE NOTES
The present policy is for the insurer to either turn the matter over to
house counsel or to an independent attorney. In any case, only one at-
torney is retained and he is to represent both the insured and the in-
surer. 96 The law requires the insurer, in cases of excess-limits claims,
to notify the insured that the claim against him exceeds his policy
limits and that he has a right to hire personal counsel to represent his in-
terests in the resulting conflict of interests situation.9 7  This notice is
customarily given to the insured by letter.98 If the insured wishes to re-
tain personal counsel, he must do so at his own expense. 99
Since the policy requires the insurer to "defend" the insured and
since the court in Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. said "it is common
knowledge that one of the usual methods by which an insured receives
[defense] under a liability insurance policy is by settlement of claims
without litigation," 100 it does not seem an undue extension of present
law to require that the insured be adequately represented by counsel at the
insurer's expense during the negotiation of such settlement. The insurer's
attorney would continue to represent both the insured and the insurer in
trial and all phases of the defense where the interests are not in conflict.101
Such a solution would not relieve the insurer of its duties under present
law, but it would avoid burdening the insurer with the impossible duty of
discussing contributions as required by Brockstein.
Edward L. Schrenk
LANDLORD AND TENANT-
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY-
HOW "CONSTRUCTIVE" IS "EVICTION"?
Plaintiff, a New York businessman, his wife, and their four children
arrived on the island of Oahu, Hawaii, on September 1, 1964. On
September 21, they inspected a furnished Tahitian-style residence of
relatively open structure owned by the defendant. The house was on
96. Supra note 5, at 1168-69.
97. See note 48, and text supra.
98. Supra note 5, at 1169.
99. Supra note 5, at 1169; Brockstein II, supra note 1, at 707 n.6.
100. Supra note 3.
101. If because of special circumstances there were a conflict of interests in
the actual conduct of the trial, two attorneys could be utilized here also. See
supra note 5, at 1170.
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the beach, in a luxury section of Hawaii; the woven cocoanut leaves on
the corrugated-iron roof and the absence of screening on windows and
doorways indicated why the residence was called "The Grass Shack."'
The tour, conducted by defendant's agent, lasted at least one-half hour
during the middle of the day. The entire premises were inspected, in-
cluding the bedrooms. 2 Because of the enthusiastic reception by plaintiff
and his family, a rental agreement was executed that night. The term of
the lease was for eight months at a monthly rental of $800.00.3
The next day, September 22, 1964, plaintiff and his family took
possession of the premises. On that night their first encounter with
rats occurred, which resulted in the entire family remaining in the living
room all night, with all doors and windows shut. Immediately after the
first night, plaintiff contacted defendant's agent, who engaged the services
of a local exterminator, Terminix. Terminix sent agents to examine the
premises and take steps to eliminate the rats. As a result of the efforts of
Terminix, several dead rats were found on the grounds-one rat died
between the sliding doors of the living room as it attempted to squeeze
back into the house from the outside.4  Plaintiff also purchased two
traps, which proved successful." However, all the endeavors were only
partially successful, for the rat problem was "mostly outside" of the house,
and the open structure of the dwelling permitted free ingress and egress
to the vermin. 6
On the second or third night of their occupancy, a rat jumped out of a
kitchen cupboard a few feet from plaintiff-a rat said to be at least three
feet long.7 On the third night, which they again spent in the living room,
1. Opening Brief of Appellant at 2, Lemle v. Breeden, - H. -, 462 P.2d 470
(1969).
2. Memorandum of Appellant at 3, Lemle v. Breeden, supra note 1.
3. Answering Brief of Appellee at 1, Lemle v. Breeden, supra note 1.
4. Id. at 2.
5. Supra note 2, at 4; Record at 23.
6. Deposition of Mr. William K. Ouchi, agent of Terminix, at 12, lines 2-6,
24-25; at 13, lines 2-18, 21-22, 24-25; at 14, lines 1-25; and at 15, lines 1-8, in
which Mr. Ouchi stated that rats were found "all over" the island, and that screens
on the doors and windows would virtually eliminate the infestation on the inside of
the house. But plaintiff had been informed by the exterminators before he vacated
the property that the rats could not be completely controlled because of the grass
roof, which necessitated greater security measures (See Record at 25, and Plaintiff's
Exhibit "3"). Mr. Ouchi's testimony, however, is further vindicated by the fact
that, after screens were installed, defendant sub-let the house in order to mitigate
damages and no complaints were had from the new tenants (See Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit "9" paragraph 2).
7. Record at 22-23.
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the tenants heard a "parade of rats" in the second floor bedrooms'
Finally, on September 25, plaintiff gave notice to defendant's agent, and he
and his family vacated the premises.
Plaintiff brought this action to recover his deposit and first month's
rent, alleging constructive eviction and breach of an implied warranty of
habitability and fitness for use. Justice Bernard H. Levinson, in writing
the opinion of the court, found for the plaintiff tenant, and held that in
the lease of a dwelling house, there is an implied warranty of habitability
and fitness for the intended use. The same reasoning which implies a
warranty of fitness and merchantability in the law of sales was found
to be equally persuasive in leases of real property, which is not only a sale
of an interest in land, but also a contractual relationship. The judge dis-
carded the admitted judicial fiction of constructive eviction as an excep-
tion to the general doctrine of caveat emptor, and espoused the more
flexible doctrine of implied warranty. He found that the implied warranty
doctrine recognizes the nature of the transaction and contemporary housing
realities and provides the tenant with a choice among the three basic
remedies for breach of contract: damages, reformation, and rescission. In
this holding is the basic importance of the case. Lemle v. Breeden,
H. -, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
The purpose of this note is to examine the historical setting within
which the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability was first expressed,
and the struggle the American courts have had with it; particular focus is
upon leases and vermin infestation, whether they be of apartments or
dwelling houses, as viewed in the light of the determinative factors courts
have found to be paramount. It will be seen that many of the arguments
expressed in favor of constructive eviction render conversion to the doc-
trine of implied warranty easily effectuated, should courts choose to
make the implied warranty an integral part of today's law.
At early common law, the contract law concept of mutual dependency
of the various provisions relating to the performance of bilateral contracts
was in its infancy. Property law, however, had long since established the
doctrine that a lease was a conveyance of realty for a term.9 Being
strictly a conveyance, and without mutual dependency, the landlord's
8. Supra note 1, at 3.
9. Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1279, 1281 (1960);
Note, The Indigent Tenant and the Doctrine of Constructive Eviction, WASH. U.
L.Q. 461 (1968) [hereinafter called The Indigent Tenant]; 6 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS § 890 (3rd ed. 1962). But American courts are firmly headed in the
direction of treating a lease as both a conveyance and a contract, see 1 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.11 (Casner ed. 1952).
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performance was completed upon his relinquishing the property to the
tenant at the beginning of the term. But the tenant's performance was
the payment of rent throughout the term; and, moreover, he "purchased"
only the land. Thus, if the house in which he was living was destroyed
during the term, he was still liable for rent.
Since the tenant "owned" the property, it was he who assumed the
responsibility for its maintenance. Also, since the transaction was
looked upon as a conveyance, it was very easy indeed for the law to
apply the same principle it had prospectively applied to sales of freehold
interests in property: the doctrine of caveat emptor.10
Thus, in the absence of an express covenant requiring more on the part
of the landlord, he was not compelled to deliver the premises in a fit
condition for habitability, and the lessee took the property "as is."'"
The law, of course, looked upon both parties as being in an equal bar-
gaining position. Because of this, the lessee was thought to be able to
negotiate such a covenant into the lease freely. Certainly it was not the
province of the law to imply such a covenant. 12
With the turn of the nineteenth century, a new doctrine was introduced
which afforded a quantum of solace to the unfortunate tenant who found
himself in fief to a remiss or hostile landlord. Should the conduct of the
landlord render the premises seriously uninhabitable, the lessee, if he
quickly quit the premises, could consider himself constructively evicted,
and could in this manner avoid the necessity of paying rent for premises
in which he could not live.1 3  The doctrine of constructive eviction thus
became the ultimate weapon in the tenant's limited arsenal.
10. Caveat emptor (let the buyer beware) imposes a duty of inspection of the
premises on the tenant. If the tenant evades his responsibility, it is his fault if the
premises are in fact uninhabitable. See Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 62 (1809); The
Indigent Tenant, supra note 9, at 462-63.
11. The Indigent Tenant, supra note 9, at 463. See also Hopkins v. Murphy,
infra note 38.
12. The Indigent Tenant, supra note 9. See Goldstein v. Totman, 163 Misc. 114,
116, 297 N.Y.S. 135, 138 (1937). For modern attempts of tenants to attain an
"equal bargaining position," see Fossum, Rent Withholding and the Improvement
of Substandard Housing, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 304 (1965); and Note, 77 YALE L.J.
1368 (1967-1968).
13. The leading case in constructive eviction is Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 535
(N.Y. 1826). See The Indigent Tenant, supra note 9, at 467-69: "In the early
cases, the application of the doctrine of constructive eviction was generally lim-
ited to those situations in which the conduct of the landlord had rendered the prem-
ises uninhabitable, and even today it is universally held that the tenant may not es-
cape rent liability by abandoning the premises because of minor inconveniences or
defects. . . . Gradually, however, courts began to listen sympathetically to argu-
ments that the tenant should be able to claim a constructive eviction when the
[Vol. XIX
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By 1840, several concepts were found in the landlord-tenant milieu:
the lease as a sale of realty, with independent performances to be ren-
dered by each party; caveat emptor applying to all prospective tenants;
the "equal bargaining position" assumption; and the "new" doctrine of
constructive eviction. It was in this setting that the case of Smith v.
Marrable14 arose. Smith leased a house to Marrable, the lease agreement
providing for the letting of a furnished house for five weeks. Marrable
soon found the premises to be infested with bugs and left after one week.
In an action for rent for the entire term, the English court stated:
This case involves the question whether, in point of law, a person who lets a
house must be taken to let it under the implied condition that it is in a state fit
for decent and comfortable habitation, and whether he is at liberty to throw it
up, when he makes the discovery that it is not so. .... 15
[f the demised premises are encumbered with a nuisance of so serious a nature
that no person can reasonably be expected to live in them, the tenant is at liberty
to throw them up.... [I]t ... rests in an implied condition of law, that [the lessor]
undertakes to let them in a habitable state. .... 16
Thus the court, in rather broad terms, gave the tenant a new weapon-
the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability-which did not require
conduct by the landlord sufficient to "constructively evict" the tenant.
The doctrine was soon to be qualified.
Smith v. Marrable came under attack in two other English cases decided
in the same year, Sutton v. Temple1'7 and Hart v. Windsor.' s The
Sutton case involved the lease of an estate of grazing land, which was to
extend for a period of seven months. The animals set out to graze died
because of the presence of refuse paint on the grass. The court rejected
the lessee's defense that the estate was not fit for the intended use. In
doing so, the court distinguished Smith, saying that there the lease con-
templated a use by Marrable not only of realty (the land and house), but
premises are not necessarily uninhabitable, but are worthless, through the fault
of the landlord, for the particular purposes for which they were rented. This
change in the attitude of the courts is reflected by an early Michigan decision
[citing Grinnell Bros. v. Asiuliewicz, 241 Mich. 186, 216 N.W. 388 (1927)] ....
Today it appears that a majority of jurisdictions recognize that constructive evic-
tion may occur when the conduct of the landlord causes the premises to become
uninhabitable or unfit for the particular purpose for which they were leased ...
[citing Berwick Corp. v. Kleinginna Invest. Corp., 143 So.2d 684 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1962); Overstreet v. Rhodes, 212 Ga. 521, 93 S.E.2d 715 (1956)]."
14. 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (Ex. 1843).
15. Id. at 694.
16. Id. at 694.
17. 152 Eng. Rep. 1108 (Ex. 1843).
18. 152 Eng. Rep. 1114 (Ex. 1843).
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also of personalty (the furniture therein).19 The Sutton case was for land
alone; therefore, the Smith doctrine did not apply.
The court in the Hart case was presented with substantially the same
facts as in Smith. Here too was involved the lease of a house with
furnishings; here too the tenant left because of an infestation of the
premises with bugs. But the term of the lease in this case was for three
years. The court seized upon the opportunity to limit the doctrine of
Smith v. Marrable. The court would now apply the doctrine of implied
warranty of habitability only in the case of a furnished dwelling leased
for a period of short and definite duration. It is with this doctrine, as so
limited, that courts in England and in America have wrestled for over a
century.20
In America, it was generally held that, in the absence of a statute,
there was no implied warranty of habitability or fitness for intended use.
21
Certain courts, even when presented with a problem of constructive evic-
tion, could not eschew the chance of commenting on the Smith doctrine.2 2
One New York court refused constructive eviction even though the rooms
19. The lease agreement was stated to be of a "mixed nature, being a bargain
for a house and furniture, which was necessarily such as was fit for the purpose
for which it was to be used. It resembles the case of a ready-furnished room in an
hotel, which is hired on the understanding that it shall be reasonably fit for
immediate habitation. In such case the bargain is not so much for the house as
the furniture .. " Supra note 17, at 65, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1113.
20. For well-presented discussions of the Smith, Sutton, and Hart cases, see
Reubens v. Hill, 115 Ill. App. 565, 570-75, af 'd 213 Ill. 523, 72 N.E. 1127 (1905);
Murray v. Albertson, 50 N.J.L. 167, 13 A. 394 (1888). See also White v. Walker,
31 Ill. 422 (1863); Eskin v. Freedman, 53 Ill. App. 2d 144, 152-54, 203 N.E.2d
24, 27-28 (1964).
21. See Little Rock Ice Co. v. Consumers Ice Co., 144 Ark. 532, 170 S.W. 241
(1914); Davidson v. Fischer, 11 Colo. 583, 19 P. 652 (1888); Moore v. Weber,
71 Pa. 429, 10 Am. Rep. 708 (1872); Annot., 343 A.L.R. 711; Annot., 29 A.L.R.
53 (1924); Annot., 13 A.L.R. 818 (1921); Annot., 4 A.L.R. 1462 (1919); 1
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45 (Casner ed. 1952); and 2 POWELL, THE LAW
OF REAL PROPERTY § 225 (Rohan ed. 1967).
22. See, e.g., Franklin v. Brown, 118 N.Y. 110, 111, 23 N.E. 126, 127 (1889):
"[T]he principle that there is an implied condition or covenant in a lease that the
property is reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was let, as laid down in Smith
v. Marrable, has been frequently questioned by the courts of this country, and
has never been adopted as the law of this state . . . . We have [been] referred to
no decision of this court involving the application of that principle to-the lease of a
ready-furnished house, and it is not necessary to now pass upon the question,
because the case under consideration differs from the English cases above men-
tioned in two significant particulars: (1) It involves a lease for the ordinary
period of one year, instead of a few weeks or months during the fashionable season.
(2) The cause of complaint did not originate upon the leased premises, was not
under the control of the lessor, and was not owing to his wrongful act or de-
fault .. " See also Annot., 4 A.L.R. 1453, 1453-59, 1468-80 (1919).
rented by the tenant were overrun with vermin, making it "inconvenient"
to inhabit the premises and rendering them untenantable.23 However, the
emphasis of the courts remained primarily on caveat emptor and the
presence or absence of express covenants imposing greater duties on the
landlord; reliance on an implied warranty of habitability was consistently
avoided. 24
In the twentieth century, the status of the caveat emptor-express cove-
nant philosophy, constructive eviction doctrine, and the principle of im-
plied warranty is best described not as a trichotomy, but as a continuum,
with the subclass R being the landlord-tenant relationship itself. The
caveat emptor-express covenant philosophy places the onus of inspecting
the premises on the tenant. It is thought that the tenant enters into the
relationship with his eyes open. Such a factor as uninhabitability is looked
upon as not evading those eyes.
While the constructive eviction doctrine places the burden of inspection
on the tenant also, it does not require the tenant to be a good judge of
character. 25  Thus, if the landlord causes the premises to become unin-
habitable, the doctrine allows the tenant to avoid the payment of rent by
a speedy abandonment of the premises.
Although constructive eviction allows for abandonment when the premi-
ses become untenantable after occupancy has begun, the principle of the
implied warranty of habitability, besides providing for additional reme-
dies, has the incidence of unhabitabiity occurring at the beginning of
the tenancy, 26 and allows abandonment for conditions not caused by the
landlord. 27 This continuum has been used by the courts, and in being
so used, it was necessary to find conceptual bridges for the vacillation.
It is not uncommon, even today, for both lawyers and courts to argue
23. Pomeroy v. Tyler, 9 N.Y. St. Rep. 514 (1887).
24. Typical of the language used by the courts in these circumstances is the
following quotation from Jacobs v. Morand, 59 Misc. Rep. 200, 201, 110 N.Y.S.
20 (1908): "[N]o evidence was given of any express covenant in the lease to keep
the apartment free from vermin; and, in the absence of such a covenant, the
lessee ... in the absence of fraud, deceit, or wrongdoing on the part of the
[landlord], ran the risk of the condition of the property in that regard .... ." It
might be noted at this point also that in Lemle the court was confronted with
dictum to this effect when it rendered the decision about which this note is con-
cerned: "In the absence of an express covenant the landlord is not obliged to re-
pair, nor is he responsible for the uninhabitable condition of the premises. . ....
Peterson v. Frazier, 18 H. 457, 458 (1907).
25. See text accompanying infra notes 38, 39 and 40.
26. See text accompanying infra notes 36 and 37.
27. As the rats were not controllable on the island of Oahu in Lemle v. Bree-
den, supra note 1.
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not only the constructive eviction doctrine, but also the implied warranty
principle, in cases of vermin infestation. One of the first conceptual
bridges found for doing so was the difference between "modem" condi-
tions and the common law. 28  Because a tenant has placed upon him the
duty not to commit waste, he cannot effectually solve the problem of
vermin himself, for the job would necessarily entail a partial destruction
of the premises. It was therefore found that "[i]n the absence of a con-
trary provision in a written lease for [a third floor] apartment in a modem
multiple apartment building, the landlord impliedly warrants that the
premises will be habitable .... -29
Another perhaps more persuasive "bridge" was the "consistency with
the current legislative policy" argument, advanced by the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court in Pines v. Perssion30 this time striking a definite blow at
caveat emptor:
To follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability in leases [of ac-
commodations for housing] would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with the current
legislative policy concerning housing standards. The need and social desirability
of adequate housing for people in this era of rapid population increases is too im-
portant to be rebuffed by that obnoxious legal clich6, caveat emptor.81
The court quoted with approval an English case 2 which argued that the
implied warranty concept promotes the public good and preserves the
public health.
The most persuasive argument given, especially for the typical Smith v.
Marrable5 situation of the rental of a furnished dwelling for a period of
short and definite duration, is that the lessee does not have an adequate
28. Delamater v. Foreman, 184 Minn. 428, 429, 239 N.W. 148, 149 (1931):
"The rule at common law was that the law did not impliedly impose [the duty of rid-
ding an apartment of insects] upon the landlord. This rule still prevails as to the
leasing of an unfurnished dwelling house. But such a rule . . .is not flexible ...
and must be construed to meet conditions unknown at common law." The tenant's
apartment was infested with bedbugs. The language above was used even though
the tenant defended on the ground of constructive eviction.
29. Id. at 428, 239 N.W. at 148.
30. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). See also infra note 53.
31. Id. at 596, 111 N.W.2d at 412. This argument seems feasible in Illinois,
since the following dictum, used in an appellate case, was cited by the court:
"[T]he Housing Code represents a significant change from common-law standards.
... The Housing Code thus establishes a duty of care based upon contemporary
conditions, values and norms of conduct in this community. We must assume that
the ordinance reflects the collective judgment of the community .... ." Gula v.
Gawel, 71 111. App. 2d 174, 183-84, 218 N.E.2d 42, 46 (1966). See also Whetzel
v. Jess Fisher Realty Co., 282 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
32. Collins v. Hopkins, 2 K.B. 617, 34 A.L.R. 703, 705 (1923).
33. Supra note 14.
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opportunity to inspect the premises before he accepts the lease. 34 This
is also a direct attack on caveat emptor.
Armed now with the arguments courts have used during the twentieth
century to traverse the continuum, an examination of the determinative
factors courts have considered in deciding whether or not they will cross
is necessary. These factors are: (1) the time of vermin infestation; (2)
the conduct of the landlord; (3) the conduct of the tenant; and (4) .the
gravity of the condition.
As noted previously, the doctrine of constructive eviction enables
a tenant to vacate the premises for an act of the landlord which deprives
the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of the estate to which he is en-
titled by the lease agreement.3 5  The nature of the action permits a
quitting of the property after the beginning of the term, should the con-
structive eviction (i.e., act of the landlord) occur after that time.
The courts, however, when confronted with applying the principle of
the implied warranty of habitability, have almost uniformly held that the
condition of uninhabitability must be present at the beginning of the term
in order for the landlord to have been in breach of the warranty.3 6 This,
at least for policy reasons, makes good sense. Just as constructive
34. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, § 3.45, supra note 21; Lesar, supra note
9, at 1283-87.
35. See text following supra note 25; see also The Automobile Supply Co. v.
The Scene-in-Action Corp., 340 Ill. 196, 172 N.E. 35 (1930).
36. See Legere v. Asselta, 342 Mass. 178, 179, 172 N.E.2d 685, 686 (1961),
in which the court states "The implied condition [that the premises are fit for
habitation] is based upon the inference that the lessee intends immediately to
occupy the premises as they stand. Moreover, the condition is implied only with
regard to the state of the premises at the beginning of the tenancy and does not
cover defects which arise later . . . . The house was fit for habitation when the
[lessee] took possession. That is the extent of the [landlord's] warranty." Dav-
enport v. Squibb, 320 Mass. 629, 632-33, 70 N.E.2d 793, 795 (1947); Hopkins
v. Murphy, 233 Mass. 476, 124 N.E. 252 (1919) [Noted in Annot., 13 A.L.R. 816
(1919)]. In the latter case there were no cockroaches in the leased premises until
more than two years after the tenant's occupancy began. The landlord "was not
responsible for the presence of the cockroaches, and . . . he did nothing with the
intention and effect of depriving the [tenant] of the demised premises." Id. at
477-78, 124 N.E. at 252-53. See also Ingalls v. Hobbs, 56 Mass. 348, 31 N.E.
286 (1892); Sarson v. Roberts, 2 Q.B. 395 (1895). But see Mr. Justice Bazelon's
strong dissent in Bowles v. Mahoney, 202 F.2d 320, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1952). Speak-
ing with reference to the common law rule that there was no liability on the part of
the landlord for injury resulting from a defect in the premises which arose during
the term, he stated: "I think that rule is an anachronism which has lived on
through stare decisis alone rather than through pragmatic adjustment to 'the felt
necessities of [our] time.' I would therefore discard it and cast the presumptive
burden of liability on the landlord. This, I think, is the command of the realities
and mores of our day."
1970]
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eviction requires an act on the part of the landlord, it stands to reason
that he should be held liable for a condition in or about the premises
which was present when they were let. However, once the lessee is given
exclusive possession, an argument might be made that any condition of
uninhabitability arising thereafter would be more likely to be caused by him
alone than by the landlord.37
The impact of caveat emptor was felt in the 1900's by a concentration
on the conduct of the landlord. The earlier cases were decided by
courts which felt constrained to refuse a remedy to the tenant in the ab-
sence of fraud, misrepresentation, or active concealment on the part of
the landlord.38 At least one author has stated a counter-argument to
the former proposition:
Although it is true that many defects which render premises untenantable are
obvious, some, at least, are latent. Defects of this nature include vermin infesta-
tion. . . Such inadequacies are often not discoverable by the untrained eye of
the prospective tenant, and consequently, if known by the landlord, constitute
fraudulent nondisclosure and give the tenant the right of rescission or an action
for damages based on deceit. .... 30
The question therefore remains open whether or not it is the landlord's
duty to discover these inadequacies." But recently the New Jersey Supreme
Court in Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper40 stated:
It has come to be recognized that ordinarily the lessee does not have as much
[knowledge of the premises] as the lessor. . . . [The lessor] is in a better position
to know of latent defects, structural and otherwise, in a building, which might go
unnoticed by a lessee who rarely has sufficient knowledge or expertise to see or
to discover them. A prospective lessee . . . cannot be expected . . . to hire
experts to advise him. Ordinarily all this information should be considered readily
available to the lessor who in turn can inform the prospective lessee. These factors
37. Supra note 28, at 430, 239 N.W. at 149: "[If the premises become unin-
habitable without the fault of the landlord] he has no concern therewith, and the
responsibility for such presence [of cockroaches] is necessarily with the tenant."
(Emphasis added).
38. See, e.g., Leech v. Husbands, 34 Del. 362, 366, 152 A. 729, 731 (1930):
"[I]n the absence of fraud, there is no implied . . . representation . . .that a house
or apartment is free from vermin, bugs, or disease germs, and ...such conditions
should usually be guarded against by express covenants. . . ."; Hopkins v. Mur-
phy, supra note 36, at 477, 124 N.E. at 252: "In the absence ... of fraudulent
representations or concealment by the lessor, the lessee takes the demised premises as
they exist and the rule of caveat emptor applies." But see Jamison v. Ellsworth,
115 Iowa 90, 87 N.W. 723 (1901), which held for the landlord even in the presence
of false representations attending the lease. See also Jacobs v. Morand, supra
note 24.
39. Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54
GEo. L.J. 519, 522 (1966). See, e.g., Ackarey v. Carbonaro, 320 Mass. 537, 70
N.E.2d 418 (1946). Compare Deskey v. Lack, 11 H. 395, 396-97 (1898).
-40: 53 N.J. -444, 251 A.2d -268 (1969).
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have produced persuasive arguments for re-evaluation of the caveat emptor doctrine
and, for imposition of an implied warranty that the premises are suitable for the
leased purposes and conform to local codes and zoning laws.4 1
Assuming, arguendo, that vermin infestation is latent, might it not then
be assumed to be information readily available to the lessor? If so, the
landlord might have the duty to inspect for the defects and to inform the
tenant of them, or be held liable for fraudulent nondisclosure, giving rise
to rescission.
Over the years, courts have occasionally considered the conduct of the
tenant to be of some import in reaching a decision. One possible explana-
tion for this approach is the necessity of the courts to in some way side-
step caveat emptor (which they are understandably reluctant to do), in
granting relief to a tenant. Before they do this, and without an actual
constructive eviction by the landlord, they on occasion observe whether or
not the tenant tried unsuccessfully to exterminate the vermin himself, or at
least whether the tenant afforded such an opportunity to the landlord. 4 2
Thus, the fact that a tenant merely vacated was looked upon with dis-
favor by some courts. 43  Likewise, if the premises were uninhabitable, it
41. Id. at 452, 251 A.2d at 272. Compare Horton v. Marston, 352 Mass. 322,
225 N.E.2d 311 (1967), which held that in a rental of a summer cottage for nine
months, the risk of concealed defects remained on the landlord, with Owens v. Ram-
sey, 213 Ky. 279, 282, 280 S.W. 1112, 1114 (1926): "There is no allegation that
plaintiff fraudulently represented to or concealed from defendant the alleged
fact that the house was infested with rats and cockroaches; but it is only alleged
that the plaintiff did know it was so infested, or could have known the same by
the exercise of ordinary care and diligence." (Emphasis added). The trend seems
to be toward granting a tenant a remedy even in the face of inaction by the land-
lord. See Note, 13 BAYLOR L. REV. 62, 64 (1961).
42. In Leo v. Santagada, 45 Misc. 2d 309, 310, 256 N.Y.S.2d 511, 513 (1964)
the court said: "The law is well settled, the condition must be such that the tenant
neither caused nor can cope with it. The landlord must also have the oppor-
tunity to remedy the situation. The plaintiffs-tenants made no attempt to help
themselves by using what an ordinary housewife would use under the same circum-
stances nor did they notify defendant-landlord to afford him an opportunity to
remedy the situation." See Morgenthau v. Ehrich, 77 Misc. 139, 136 N.Y.S. 140(1912). The lease here involved a furnished house for the winter season, which
would seem to be well within the doctrine of implied warranty. The house was
so overrun with vermin that it turned out to be untenantable. The court took note
that the tenants' efforts to cure the infestation with corrosive sublimate were un-
successful. See also Ray Realty Co. v. Holtzman, 234 Mo. App. 802, 119 S.W.2d
981 (1938).
43. See Leo v. Santagada, supra note 42. See generally Charlie's Transfer Co.
v. Malone, 159 Ala. 325, 48 So. 705 (1909); Smith v. State, 92 Md. 518, 48 A. 92
(1901); Chapin Publicity Co. v. Saybrook Holding Corp., 105 N.J.L. 215, 147 A.
490 (1929); Goldberg v. Reed, 97 N.J.L. 170, 116 A. 429 (1922); Whitcomb v.
Bryant, 76 N.J.L. 201, 68 A. 1102 (1908); Murray v. Albertson, supra note 20;
Wainwright v. Helmer, 193 N.Y.S. 653 (1922 Sup. Ct. App. term); Westlake
v. De Graw, 25 Wend. 669 (N.Y. 1841).
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was believed that the tenant would not wait too long to complain to the
landlord or vacate the premises.44 The reasoning was that a person could
not claim uninhabitability and yet continue to live in the premises. 45
The feasibility of such an inquiry is lessened when compared to the
very nature of an action in implied warranty. The warranty, if present
in a lease, is broken or not broken by the presence or absence of the con-
dition of inhabitability existing at the inception of the landlord-tenant re-
lationship, i.e., when the lease agreement is entered into and the tenant
takes possession of the property. The breach or non-breach of the
warranty occurring at that time renders any discussion of later action or
inaction by the lessee superfluous, unless it be considered only in mitiga-
tion of damages or in assessing the gravity of the infestation.
As soon as the courts enter into the implied warranty spectrum of the
continuum, one factor of primary importance is the gravity of the condi-
tion of infestation, which causes, according to the tenant, the breach of the
warranty. Although this is normally a question of fact, 46 it is clear
that recovery should not be granted for twelve cockroaches, 47 or two bed-
bugs. 48
It is to be remembered that the courts use the conceptual bridges and
the sundry focuses discussed above on a case-to-case basis. An examina-
tion of the type of premises to which the rules are applied is thus in
order. While the legacy of Smith v. Marrable is universally accepted
in America,49 nevertheless certain trends can be plotted.
44. In Griffin v. Freeborn, 181 Mo. App. 203, 168 S.W. 219 (1914), the tenant
remained in possession for fifteen months after the conditions were discovered.
See generally Applegate v. Wojaczyk, 103 N.J. Super. 455, 247 A.2d 678 (1955);
Duncan Development Co. v. Duncan Hardware, 34 N.J. Super. 293, 112 A.2d 274
(1955); Doyle v. Colosante, 65 A.2d 863 (N.J. 1949); Ellis v. McDermott, 7 N.J.
Misc. 757, 147 A. 236 (1929); Gunther v. Oliver, 97 N.J.L. 376, 117 A. 402,
aff'd 98 N.J.L. 563, 119 A. 925 (1923); Heilbrun v. Aaronson, 116 N.Y.S. 1096
(1909); Annot., 91 A.L.R. 2d 638 (1963).
45. See, e.g., Bowles v. Mahoney, supra note 36; Two-Rector Street Corp. v.
Bein, 226 App. Div. 73, 234 N.Y.S. 409 (1929); Chelten Ave. Bldg. Corp. v.
Mayer, 316 Pa. 228, 172 A. 675 (1934).
46. It has been suggested that if the condition can be remedied by the tenant,
it is not sufficiently grave. See generally Masser v. London Operating Co., 106
Fla. 474, 145 So. 79 (1932); Ben Har Holding Corp. v. Fox, 147 Misc. 300, 263
N.Y.S. 695 (1933); Wainwright v. Helmer, 193 N.Y.S. 653 (1922 Sup. Ct. App.
Term); Michtom v. Miller, 178 N.Y.S. 395 (1919 Sup. Ct. App. Term); Jacobs v.
Morand, supra note 24; Parmelee v. Pulvola Chem. Co., 31 Misc. 818 (N.Y. 1900).
47. Leo v. Santagada, supra note 42.
48. Michtom v. Miller, supra note 46.
49. See Skillern, Implied Warranties in Leases: The Need for Change, 44
DENVER L.J. 387, 392 (1967)..
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At least one change from the common law with which courts have
had to cope is the prevalence of apartment house dwelling. It still, how-
ever, is not entirely clear whether any particular court will grant the
tenant relief, for some courts place their emphasis upon the inability of the
lessee to cope with the situation, while other courts stress the inability of
the landlord to alleviate the condition, especially where the uninhabit-
able condition arises not from the premises itself, but from the outside.50
If anything of substance can be garnered from the cases, it is safe to say
that the tenant will most probably be protected if the infestation is
present in other apartments in the same building, with a trend of liberality
in placing the burden on the landlord.51
It is with houses that the implied warranty doctrine has found its earliest
and most lasting fruition. It may be noted at this point that the principle
of the implied warranty has even been recently extended to sales of
new houses.5 2  With leases of houses, however, the true impact of Smith
50. See Barnard Realty Co. v. Bonwit, 155 App. Div. 182, 183, 139 N.Y.S.
1050, 1051 (1913). In this case, the tenant and his wife moved into a top f'oor
apartment. Their defense to an action for rent was constructive eviction, due to
the stench of dead rats within the walls and nightly disturbance of rats running be-
tween the walls. It is interesting to note the "change from the common law" and
waste arguments discussed (supra note 23 and accompanying text): "Very large
numbers of people live in tenement houses, apartment houses, and apartment hotels
in this city. Such tenants have, and can have, control only of the inside of their
limited demised premises. Conditions unknown to the ancient common law are
thus created. This requires elasticity in the application of the principles thereof.
An intolerable condition, which the tenant neither causes nor can remedy, seems to
me warrants the application of the doctrine of constructive eviction." Id. at 183,
139 N.Y.S. at 1051. Compare Lemle v. Breeden, supra note 1, with Stanton v.
Southwick, 2 K.B. 642, 646 (1920), in which the court states: "[T]he case was
fought upon the footing that the rats had their home in the sewer passing below
the house, that from the sewer they made incursions into the house in search of
food, and that that was how they were found to be in the house. . . . Clearly
there is no duty on the occupier above, whether he be landlord or only occupier,
to guard against an accident of this nature. It is absurd to suppose a duty on
him to exclude the possibility of the entrance of rats from without." See generally
Laffey v. Woodhull, 256 Ill. App. 325 (1930); Washington Chocolate Co. v. Kent,
183 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1947).
51. See Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806
(1967). In that case, the premises were infested with psocids. There was evidence
that the infestation came from other parts of the building and that the psocids were
present in other apartments. The lessee had waived the portion of the Civil Code
in the lease requiring the landlord to put the premises in a fit condition for occu-
pancy. The court granted the tenant relief, holding that the waiver had to be
strictly construed. Thus the tenant waived the requirements only as to the let
premises; the vermin coming from other parts of the building, to which her waiver
did not apply, caused a constructive eviction.
52. At least eight jurisdictions in the past decade have recognized an implied
warranty--of inhabitability, sound workmanship, or proper construction-in the sale
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v. Marrable is felt. The tenant in order to qualify for the warranty
ordinarily must meet two prerequisites. First, the lease must be
short-term, as opposed to long-term. 8  Second, the house must be fur-
nished, as opposed to unfurnished.5 4  This is in keeping with the spirit
of the original exception as enunciated in Smith. That case, it will be
recalled, dealt with a short-term lease of a furnished house. Sutton
and Hart made it clear that the doctrine applied in such a situation
alone. Just as it was an arduous process for courts to accept the principle
of Smith as qualified, so too has it been difficult for them to extend it.
Thus the universal acceptance of the exception to caveat emptor seems to
be confined to these narrow limits.
Illinois appears to be a steadfast champion of the common law, apply-
ing the general rule of caveat emptor consistently from the earliest cases;55
of new houses by builder-vendors. There has been a cognizance of reality by the
courts that vendees do not stand on equal footing with the builders, and are able
to protect themselves no more than buyers of mass-produced automobiles.
Wawak v. Stewart, 449 S.W.2d 922 (Ark. 1970); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo.
178, 388 P.2d 399 (1964); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698
(1966); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Waggoner v.
Midwestern Dev. Co., 154 N.W.2d 803 (S.D. 1967); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d
554 (Tex. 1968); Rothberg v. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461 (Vt. 1970); and House v.
Thornton, 457 P.2d 199 (Wash. 1969). See generally Note, 71 W. VA. L.Q. 87
(1968).
53. The foremost case on the subject is Young v. Povich, 121 Me. 141, 116 A.
26 (1922). The case held that short term leases come within the rule of implied
warranty, and, conversely, long term leases would use the rule of caveat emptor.
Short or long term was a question of fact, but the court advocated the standard
"for a temporary purpose," which would make the question one of law and fact.
The dichotomy was perfectly spelled out: caveat emptor still applied to a long
term lease of an unfurnished dwelling house. Judgment was for the tenant, how-
ever, the lease of a furnished dwelling for eight months being on the "proper" side
of the dichotomy. The longest "short term" lease was for a period of one year,
in the oft-quoted case of Pines v. Perssion, supra note 30. The tenants in this case,
however, were college students more or less at the mercy of their off-campus land-
lord, which may have proved a factor in the court's decision. See generally Zatloff
v. Winkelman, 90 R.I. 403, 158 A.2d 87 (1960).
54. Leech v. Husbands, supra note 38, at 366, 152 A. at 731 states the rule:
"[Wihatever the rule may be in a short term lease of a furnished house or apartment
where immediate occupancy is intended, the rule of caveat emptor ordinarily ap-
plies between landlord and tenant and there is no implied covenant, or even a war-
ranty, in a lease of an unfurnished house or apartment that it is either reasonably
fit or safe for habitation, or that it will remain in that condition." See Ingalls v.
Hobbs, supra note 36 at 349, 31 N.E. at 286: "It is well settled, both in this
Commonwealth and in England, that one who lets an unfurnished building to be
occupied as a dwelling-house does not impliedly agree that it is fit for habitation.
See generally Pierce v. Nash, 126 Cal. App. 2d 606, 272 P.2d 938 (1954);
Brandt v. Yeager, 199 A.2d 768 (Del. Super. 1964).
55. See Martin v. Surman, 116 Ill. App. 282, 283 (1904): "The tenant takes
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and yet it is difficult to make a perceptive prediction of the decision of
a case of import, for almost all of the cases decided have never gone
beyond the appellate level.50 The typical rule can be found in the case
of Russell v. Clark,57 an appellate court level case, wherein the court
stated:
There is no implied covenant on the part of the landlord that the premises at the
time of letting are in a tenantable condition . . . except in cases of fraudulent
concealment of hidden defects ....... In some jurisdictions it has been held
there is an implied covenant that the premises are fit for habitation at the begin-
ning of the term . . . , but in those cases this applies only to the condition of the
premises at the beginning of the tenancy, and not to defects arising subsequently,
and where the lessee inspects the premises . . . there is no reason for implying
the covenant .... "58
From the above quotation, the Illinois court is clearly applying caveat emp-
tor, laying the burden of inspection on the prospective tenant. The war-
ranty, if one is to be implied, is either broken or not broken at the
beginning of the tenancy. The court reiterates the general rule that re-
covery will not be had in the absence of fraudulent concealment of
hidden defects.
The fraudulent concealment basis of recovery brings to mind the
argument that a lessor may be obliged to examine the premises in order
to discover the hidden defects, of which vermin infestation is one, or else
be charged with the knowledge thereof.59 Such an argument in Illinois
is futile, however, at least before an appellate court, for a recent decision
the premises at his own risk, and there is no implied covenant that they are fit for
habitation or for the purposes for which they are rented. The rule caveat emptor
applies to a contract of letting."; and McCoull v. Herzberg, 33 Ill. App. 542,
545-46 (1889); "It is the settled doctrine that there is no implied contract on the
part of the landlord that the demised premises are tenantable, or that they will
continue so during the term."
56. See The Automobile Supply Co. v. The Scene-in-Action Corp., supra note 35;
Gibbons v. Hoefeld, infra note 64; White v. Walker, supra note 20; Gula v. Gawel,
supra note 31; Eskin v. Freedman, supra note 20; Hendricks v. Socony Mobil Oil
Co., infra note 60; Ciskoski v. Michaelsen, 119 Ill. App. 2d 327, 334, 152 N.E.2d
479, 482 (1958); Farmer v. Alton Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 294 Il. App. 206 (1938);
Laffey v. Woodhull, supra note 50; Allmon v. Davis, infra note 62; Reubens v. Hill,
supra note 20; Carpenter v. Stone, 112 Ill. App. 155 (1904); Martin v. Surman,
supra note 55; Watson v. Moulton, 100 Ill. App. 560 (1901); Sunasack v. Morey,
98 Ill. App. 505 (1901), rev'd. 196 Ill. 569, 63 N.E. 1039 (1902); McCoull v. Herz-
berg, supra note 55; Blake v. Ranous, 25 Ill. App. 486 (1887). See also Cohen v.
Plumtree, 170 Ill. App. 311 (1912); Lazarus & Cohen v. Parmly, 113 Ill. App. 624
(1904); Hefling v. Van Zandt, 60 Ill. App. 662 (1895), modified 162 Ill. 162, 44
N.E. 424 (1896); and Mendel v. Fink, 8 Ill. App. 378 (1880).
57. 173 Ill. App. 461 (1912).
58. Id. at 463-64.
59. See text accompanying supra notes 40 and 41.
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has stated that the defect must be one not only undiscoverable by the
tenant, but also actually known to the landlord.00 Fraudulent conceal-
ment, it was said, "necessarily implies actual knowledge on the part of
the landlord . . .,,"
The only glimmer of hope in Illinois comes from two early cases. The
first is an early Illinois appellate case, Allmon v. Davis,a2 which stated
that it was the duty of the landlord to furnish premises that are fit for the
purpose for which they are leased. This included making a dwelling house
tenantable and habitable. 63  The second, an Illinois Supreme Court case,
decided after the turn of the century, 4 intimated that, with premises
leased for a certain purpose, the tenant was not required to take possession
unless the premises had been made tenantable for such purpose. How-
ever, the latest Illinois case on the subject,65 again on the appellate level,
had no qualms about making a finding against the tenant.
The great weight of authority remains in support of the general rule:
there is no implied warranty that leased premises will be tenantable, fit, or
in a suitable condition.6 6 The need for an implied warranty at present,
however, would seem implicit in the priorities of reality when one is
confronted with mass urban society and the ghettos it produces. The
Lemle court, in finding such a warranty, is clearly in step with the times.
In eliminating constructive eviction, however, an extension of the doc-
trine of implied warranty of habitability and fitness for use is immediately
required. Now, apparently, such warranty must run throughout the
period of the lease, and may be broken at any time, not just at the be-
ginning of the tenancy. Because, by its nature, the action for breach of
warranty relies on the condition of the premises, such an action neces-
60. Hendricks v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 45 Ill. App. 2d 44, 53, 195 N.E.2d 1, 6
(1963): "A tenant does have a right of action against the landlord for injuries re-
sulting from a latent defect only when it appears that the landlord had actual
knowledge of such defect and the defect is one which a tenant could not be ex-
pected to discover upon reasonable inspection, and when the landlord fails to dis-
close to the tenant his knowledge of the defect. The basis of such liability is
fraudulent concealment by the landlord, and this necessarily implies knowledge on
the part of the landlord." (Emphasis added).
61. Id. (Emphasis added).
62. 248 Ill. App. 350 (1928).
63. Id. at 352.
64. Gibbons v. Hoefeld, 299 Ill. 455, 132 N.E. 425 (1921), rev'g Martin v. Sur-
man, supra note 55.
65. Hendricks v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., supra note 60.
66. 32 AM. JUR. Landlord and Tenant § 654 (1941); 52 C.J.S. Landlord and
Tenant § 485 (1968); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45 (Casner ed. 1952);
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 81 (abridged ed. 1940).
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sarily embraces situations where the premises become uninhabitable by
the fault of the landlord, and would require recovery in the face of in-
action by him. Of course a value judgment must be made as to whether
a remedy will be granted where the tenant causes the condition himself.
The remedies available to the tenant under Lemle are rescission,
reformation, and the recovery of damages. While rescission equals the
vacation of the premises, reformation and damages recognize this pri-
mary weakness of constructive eviction. Often a lease entails a decision
as to the desirability of the location. With rescission, the location must be
left behind. It is often ultimately desired by the tenant, therefore, to
render the premises suitable, rather than to incur the greater expense of
relocation. Damages and reformation supply this need.
The Lemle decision still leaves unanswered some important questions.
It will be remembered that the lease term involved in the case was for a
period of approximately eight months. Likewise the rental involved the
lease of a furnished dwelling house. The result itself would, therefore,
probably have been the same in the jurisdictions that apply a liberal in-
terpretation of the Smith v. Marrable exception to caveat emptor. Thus,
although Lemle may be fairly applied to a broad range of situations, it is
conceivable that a judge will interpret the decision as being merely a
reiteration of Smith.
A practical problem created by Lemle is a change in lease forms to in-
clude a waiver by the tenant of the warranty. Reality rejects the "equal
bargaining position" of landlord and tenant argument. For apartment
dwellers, a line of attack in the presence of such a waiver is that the
waiver is to be strictly construed. Thus a waiver would apply only to
the demised premises, and the entry of vermin from other apartments in
the same building would constitute a technical breach of the warranty. 67
Clearly, legislation is the best answer for any meaningful changes. But
the law would have to be definite, as in England:
[There is an implied condition] notwithstanding any stipulation to the contrary,
• . . that the house is fit for human habitation at the commencement of the
tenancy, and an undertaking . . . that the house will be kept so fit by the landlord
during the tenancy. 68
The law applies only to low-rent housing-that with an annual rental of
67. See note 51 supra. See generally Blum and Dunham, Slumlordism as a
Tort-A Dissenting View, 66 MICH. L. REV. 451 (1967); Schier, Protecting the
Interests of the Indigent Tenant: Two Approaches, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 670 (1966);
Walsh, Slum Housing: The Legal Remedies of Connecticut Towns and Tenants,
40 CONN. B.J. 539 (1966).
68. ENGLISH HouSING ACT, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 56, § 6(2).
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£80 or less in London or £52 or less elsewhere. The enactment of such a
law is quite possible, should the current inflationary rentals and corre-
sponding pressures on the legislatures continue.
The Lemle decision represents a change in landlord-tenant law, a law
which has remained virtually unchanged for nine-hundred years. Con-
structive eviction has been relegated to the position of a legal fiction dis-
carded because not in tune with the times, while the equally ancient princi-
ples of contract law have gained ascendancy. Basic contract remedies are
thus provided the tenant, and, in addition, recovery may be had in two
situations previously inapplicable to the implied warranty concept: where
the condition of uninhabitability arises from outside the premises and is
uncontrollable by the landlord himself; and where the condition occurs
after the beginning of the term set for the lease, with or without the fault
of the landlord. Still, it will be interesting to see what the Hawaii Su-
preme Court will do with a lease of an unfurnished house for two years,
when the tenant sues for damages because of an uninhabitable condition
arising eight months or more after the beginning of his tenancy.
Robert F. Klimek
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